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Motivation
Competition in transportation
Competition is often present in the form of oligopolies (regulations,
limited capacity of the infrastructure, barriers to entry, etc.).
Deregulation often led to oligopolistic markets.
Airlines
Railways
Buses
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Motivation
Trending topic
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Motivation
How to study competitive transport markets?
Modelling demand
Modelling supply
Modelling competition
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Motivation
Modelling demand
Each customer chooses the alternative that maximizes his/her utility.
Customers have different tastes and socioeconomic characteristics
that influence their choice.
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Motivation
Modelling supply
Operators take decisions that optimize their objective function
(e.g. revenue maximization).
Decisions can be related to pricing, capacity, frequency, availability ...
Decisions are influenced by:
The preferences of the customers
The decisions of the competitors
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Motivation
Modelling competition
We consider non-cooperative games.
We aim at understanding the Nash equilibrium solutions of such
games, i.e. stationary states of the system in which no competitor has
an incentive to change its decisions.
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Modelling the problem
Modelling the problem
Starting point:
MILP for the demand-based optimization problem for one operator
(Pacheco et al. (2017)).
The goal:
MILP that models the non-cooperative multi-leader-follower game played
by operators and customers.
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Modelling the problem
The framework
Three-level framework: customers, operators and market.
1 Customer level: discrete choice models take into account preference
heterogeneity and model individual decisions. These can be integrated
in a MILP by relying on simulation to draw from the distribution of
the error term of the utility function.
2 Operators level: a mixed integer linear program can maximize any
relevant objective function.
3 Market level: Nash equilibrium solutions are found by enforcing best
response constraints.
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Modelling the problem
The framework: customer level
For all customers n ∈ N and all alternatives i ∈ I , R draws are extracted
from the error term distribution, each corresponding to a different behavioral
scenario. For each r ∈ R we have:
Uinr = βinpin + qin + ξinr
where pin is a variable endogenous to the optimization model, βin is the
corresponding parameter, qin is the exogenous term and ξinr is the error
term.
In each scenario, customers choose the alternative with the highest utility:
winr = 1 if Uinr = max
j∈I
Ujnr , and winr = 0 otherwise
Over multiple scenarios, the probability of n ∈ N choosing i ∈ I is given by:
Pin =
∑
r∈R winr
R
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Modelling the problem
The framework: operators level
We assume that an operator k ∈ K can decide on price pin and availability
yin of each alternative i ∈ Ck for all customers n ∈ N.
Stackelberg game: the operator (the leader) knows the best response of the
customers (”collective” follower) to all strategies.
Objective function to be maximized by operator k :
Vk =
1
R
∑
i∈Ck
∑
n∈N
∑
r∈R
pinwinr
SB, VL, MB Modelling competition in demand-based optimization models 14 / 29
Modelling the problem
The framework: market level
The payoff of an operator also depends on the strategies of the competitors
Let’s define as Xk the set of strategies that can be played by operator k ∈ K
Condition for Nash equilibrium (best response constraints):
Vk = V
∗
k = maxxk
Vk(xk , xK\{k}) ∀k ∈ K
Nash (1951) proves that every finite game has at least one mixed strategy
equilibrium solution
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Modelling the problem
A fixed-point iteration method
Sequential algorithm to find Nash
equilibrium solutions of a two-player
game:
Initialization: one player
selects an initial feasible
strategy.
Iterative phase: operators take
turns and each plays its best
response pure strategy to the
last strategy played by the
competitor.
Termination criterion: either a
Nash equilibrium or a cyclic
equilibrium is reached.
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Modelling the problem
A fixed-point iteration method
The algorithm reproduces the behavior of two or more operators that
do not know the competitors’ objective function.
Different initial strategies can lead to different equilibria.
There is no guarantee that a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists or
that it is unique.
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Modelling the problem
MILP formulations
Pure strategies:
Each operator k ∈ K chooses a pure strategy from a finite set Sk .
Number of pure strategy solutions of the game: |S | =∏k∈K Sk .
For each solution s ∈ S we can derive a payoff function Vks for each
operator k ∈ K .
If s ∈ S includes only best response strategies for all operators, then
it is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium for the finite game.
Mixed strategies:
Operator k chooses a mixed strategy from the finite set Sk , i.e. a
vector of probabilities psk associated to all pure strategies sk in Sk ,
such that
∑
sk∈Sk psk = 1.
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Modelling the problem
Customer level
Customer constraints:∑
i∈I
winrs = 1 ∀n ∈ N, ∀r ∈ R, ∀s ∈ S (1)
winrs ≤ yinrs ∀i ∈ I, ∀n ∈ N, ∀r ∈ R, ∀s ∈ S (2)
yinrs ≤ yins ∀i ∈ I, ∀n ∈ N, ∀r ∈ R, ∀s ∈ S (3)
yins = 0 ∀i ∈ I, ∀n ∈ N : i /∈ Cn, ∀s ∈ S (4)∑
n∈N
winrs ≤ Ci ∀i ∈ I \ {0}, ∀r ∈ R, ∀s ∈ S (5)
Ci (yins − yinrs ) ≤
∑
m∈N:Lim<Lin
wimrs ∀i ∈ I \ {0}, ∀n ∈ N, ∀r ∈ R, ∀s ∈ S (6)
∑
m∈N:Lim<Lin
wimrs ≤ (Ci − 1)yinrs + (n − 1)(1 − yinrs ) ∀i ∈ I \ {0}, ∀n ∈ N, ∀r ∈ R, ∀s ∈ S (7)
Uinrs = βinpins + q
d
in + ξinr ∀i ∈ I, ∀n ∈ N, ∀r ∈ R, ∀s ∈ S (8)
lbUnr ≤ zinrs ≤ lbUnr + MUnr yinrs ∀i ∈ I, ∀n ∈ N, ∀r ∈ R, ∀s ∈ S (9)
Uinrs − MUnr (1 − yinrs ) ≤ zinrs ≤ Uinrs ∀i ∈ I, ∀n ∈ N, ∀r ∈ R, ∀s ∈ S (10)
zinrs ≤ Unr ∀i ∈ I, ∀n ∈ N, ∀r ∈ R, ∀s ∈ S (11)
Unr ≤ zinrs + MUnr (1 − winrs ) ∀i ∈ I, ∀n ∈ N, ∀r ∈ R, ∀s ∈ S (12)
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Modelling the problem
Operator and market level (Pure strategies)
Find s ∈ S such that es = 1
s.t.
Equilibrium constraints:
es ≥
∑
k∈K
xks − (|K | − 1) ∀s ∈ S (13)
es ≤ xks ∀k ∈ K , ∀s ∈ S (14)
Operator constraints:
Vks =
1
R
∑
i∈Ck
∑
n∈N
∑
r∈R
pinswinrs ∀k ∈ K , ∀s ∈ S (15)
Vks ≤ Vmaxkt ∀k ∈ K , ∀s ∈ Sk , ∀t ∈ SCk (16)
Vmaxkt ≤ Vks + Mr (1− xks ) ∀k ∈ K , ∀s ∈ Sk , ∀t ∈ SCk (17)∑
s∈S
xks =
∣∣∣SCk ∣∣∣ ∀k ∈ K (18)
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Modelling the problem
Operator and market level (Mixed strategies)
Find psk , bsk , rsk , Vsk , Vk such that... or max
∑
k∈K
Vk or...
s.t.
MILP mixed-strategy Nash:∑
sk∈Sk
psk = 1 ∀k ∈ K (19)
Vsk =
∑
sC
k
∈SC
k
p
sC
k
Vk (sk , s
C
k ) ∀k ∈ K , ∀sk ∈ Sk (20)
Vk ≥ Vsk ∀k ∈ K , ∀sk ∈ Sk (21)
rsk = Vk − Vsk ∀k ∈ K , ∀sk ∈ Sk (22)
psk ≤ 1− bsk ∀k ∈ K , ∀sk ∈ Sk (23)
rsk ≤ Mbsk ∀k ∈ K , ∀sk ∈ Sk (24)
Pure strategy payoffs:
Vk (sk , s
C
k ) =
1
R
∑
i∈Ck
∑
n∈N
∑
r∈R
pinswinrs ∀k ∈ K , ∀(sk , sCk ) ∈ S (25)
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Modelling the problem
Numerical example: pure strategy equilibria
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Modelling the problem
Numerical example: mixed strategy equilibria
Payoff matrices of player 1 and player 2
S1 \ S2 0,75 0,77 0,79 0,81 0,83 0,85 p1 V1
0,50 10,00 10,00 10,00 10,00 10,00 10,00 0 10,00
0,52 10,40 10,40 10,40 10,40 10,40 10,40 0 10,40
0,54 10,80 10,80 10,80 10,80 10,80 10,80 0.27 10,80
0,56 10,42 10,53 10,86 11,09 11,20 11,20 0.73 10,80
0,58 9,74 9,86 10,09 10,44 10,67 11,37 0 10,05
0,60 9,60 9,60 9,72 10,08 10,44 10,68 0 9,70
S1 \ S2 0,75 0,77 0,79 0,81 0,83 0,85
0,50 14,70 14,78 14,69 14,74 14,28 14,62
0,52 14,70 15,09 14,85 14,58 14,61 14,45
0,54 14,85 14,94 15,17 14,74 14,44 14,45
0,56 14,85 14,94 14,85 14,90 14,61 14,28
0,58 15,00 15,09 15,17 15,07 15,11 14,45
0,60 15,00 15,25 15,48 15,39 15,27 14,30
p2 0 0.19 0.81 0 0 0
V2 14.85 14.94 14.94 14.86 14.56 14.33
Figure: Game with mixed strategy Nash equilibrium
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Modelling the problem
Discussion
The model requires finite strategy sets (enumeration), therefore the
problem is solvable with small solution spaces only.
The assumption of a finite game requires price discretization.
Formulation 1: all pure strategy Nash equilibria of the game can be
found, if they exist.
Formulation 2: among the mixed strategy Nash equilibria, it is
possible to select one by choosing a relevant objective function, e.g.
total welfare maximization.
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Current status of the research
A MILP model for the fixed-point problem
The fixed-point iteration method stops when the same strategies are
played in two consecutive iterations.
What if we can write a MILP model to minimize the ”difference” in
strategies between two consecutive iterations?
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Current status of the research
A MILP model for the fixed-point problem
A solution for a two-operator problem: (x1, x2)
Optimization problem for operator 1:
x∗1 = arg max
x1
V1(x1, x2, (xcust))
Optimization problem for operator 2:
x∗2 = arg max
x2
V1(x1, x2, (xcust))
Fixed-point problem:
min
x1,x2,x∗1 ,x
∗
2
‖x∗1 − x1‖+ ‖x∗2 − x2‖
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Current status of the research
Future work
Implement and test the MILP model for the fixed-point problem.
Efficient search for equilibria in the solution space.
Investigation of the concept of Nash equilibrium region for real-life
applications.
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Current status of the research
Questions?
Stefano Bortolomiol
Transport and Mobility Laboratory (TRANSP-OR)
E´cole Polytechnique Fe´de´rale de Lausanne (EPFL)
Email: stefano.bortolomiol(at)epfl.ch
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